Germany's Role in NATO's Nuclear Sharing : the Purchasing Decision forthe Tornado's Successor Aircraft by Brauß, Heinrich & Mölling, Christian
www.ssoar.info
Germany's Role in NATO's Nuclear Sharing : the
Purchasing Decision forthe Tornado's Successor
Aircraft
Brauß, Heinrich; Mölling, Christian
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Brauß, H., & Mölling, C. (2020). Germany's Role in NATO's Nuclear Sharing : the Purchasing Decision forthe Tornado's
Successor Aircraft. (DGAP Policy Brief, 4). Berlin: Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik
e.V.. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-66930-9
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence
(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
POLICY BRIEF
German Council on Foreign Relations
Germany’s Role 
in NATO’s 
Nuclear Sharing 
The Purchasing Decision for 
the Tornado’s Successor Aircraft
Germany will need to replace its aging “Tornado” combat aircraft 
from 2025. To date, the federal government is considering pur-
chasing F-18 aircraft from the United States or refitting Eurofighter 
planes. Buying state-of-the-art F-35 planes has been ruled out. 
Given Russia’s deployment of new intermediate-range missiles on 
its Western territory, this decision should be reconsidered.
 – NATO’s nuclear weapons have the purpose of preventing war 
and preserving peace. As a carrier for US nuclear bombs, the 
Tornado’s successor is essential for the credibility of Germany’s 
contribution.
 – The successor model must be able to work seamlessly and  
effectively with allied combat aircraft. By now, there are already 
seven European NATO members that have opted to buy the F-35.
 – Germany must equip its pilots with the best-suited aircraft. The 
credibility of deterrence depends on the high likelihood of a  
successful mission and the permanent availability of the planes. 
 –  For all these reasons, the federal government should include the 
F-35 fighter aircraft in its comprehensive analysis. It should then 
choose the aircraft that best fulfils the political-military criteria.
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Germany’s Defense Minister Annegret 
Kramp-Karrenbauer will decide in the 
coming weeks on the replacement for 
the country’s ageing fleet of “Tornado” 
fighter planes. During a visit to Wash-
ington in September 2019, she stated 
publicly that any successor would have 
to ensure “seamless” continuity of the 
Tornado’s capabilities. This refers to 
the plane’s capabilities as a “dual-ca-
pable aircraft” (DCA): its dual role as 
a fighter plane for conventional war-
fare and as a carrier plane for a nuclear 
mission for NATO.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014 
and its deployment of new nuclear-ca-
pable cruise missiles has led to a de-
terioration of the security situation in 
Europe. From NATO’s point of view, it 
is crucial for Germany to make an ap-
propriate and reliable contribution to 
the conventional and nuclear compo-
nents of NATO’s air forces. It therefore 
needs to provide a suitable successor 
to the Tornado in a timely manner.
So far, the federal government is 
exploring two options for replac-
ing the Tornados: purchasing Ameri-
can F-18 fighter aircraft or refitting the 
Eurofighter as a dual-capable aircraft. 
There has been no consideration given 
to buying today’s most modern fighter 
aircraft, the F-35. However, given the 
changes in the security environment, 
this approach is too narrow. F-35 air-
craft should be included in the com-
parative review. This follows from the 
analysis of the requirements of nuclear 
sharing and nuclear risk sharing within 
NATO, as this study shows.
1  According to US sources, Russia has so far deployed four battalions with a total of 64 systems in Kapustin Jar, Kamyšlov, Mosdok, and Šuja. In: Gutschker, Thomas: 
„Russland verfügt über mehr Raketen als bislang bekannt“, Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung vom 10.2.1019; https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/russland-
verfuegt-ueber-mehr-raketen-als-bislang-bekannt-16032894.html (accessed on January 29, 2020).
2  The last missile covered by the INF Treaty was dismantled in Ma1991.
3  These are mostly sea- and airbased Kalibr 3M14, Kh 55/55SM and Kh 101/102cruise missiles. All in all, Russia has around 1800 nuclear warheads for medium-range 
missiles, in: Brauss, Heinrich/Krause, Joachim: Was will Russland mit den vielen Mittelstreckenwaffen? In: SIRIUS 2019, 3(2), 154-166; https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/
sirius.2019.3.issue-2/sirius-2019-2005/sirius-2019-2005.xml?format=INT (accessed on January 29, 2020).
4  See NATO – Press conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg following the meetings of NATO Defense Ministers on June 26 2019;  https://www.nato.int/cps/
en/natohq/opinions_167072.htm?selectedLocale=en (accessed on February 6, 2020).
5  NATO – Press point by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg on the INF Treaty, 2 August 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_168183.
htm?selectedLocale=en (accessed on January 29, 2020).
6  Moscow’s “Strategy of Active Defense” was presented by General V. Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia, in a lecture at the Combined Arms 
Academy for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in Moscow on March 2, 2019. In: Dave Johnson, “General Gerasimov on the Vectors of the Development of Military 
Strategy,” NATO Defense College, March 30, 2019.
7  With a range of around 2300 km, the new Russian medium-range missiles can reach most of Europe but not the United States. This has brought back the old European fear 
of a decoupling of Europe’s from America’s security as it existed at the time of NATO’s double-track decision in 1979. In: Brauß, Heinrich/Mölling, Christian: Europas Sicherheit 
ohne INF-Vertrag. Politische und strategische Handlungsoptionen für Deutschland und die NATO, Berlin: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik (DGAP Kompakt), Januar 
2019; https://dgap.org/system/files/article_pdfs/2019-01-DGAPkompakt.pdf (accessed on January 29, 2020).
8  For the time being, this is a theoretical scenario. But such a situation could arise if the United States had massive numbers of troops tied down in the Far East in a future 
military conflict with China. From a Russian perspective, this could constitute a favorable opportunity in Europe where the risks might appear manageable.
THE STRATEGIC 
FRAMEWORK
Russia’s violation of the INF Treaty and 
its deployment of the new 9M729/
SSC-8 intermediate-range missiles 
in the Western part of its territo-
ry1 have caused great concern with-
in NATO. For the first time since 1991, 
Europe  has come under threat from 
Russia by land-based, accurate, nucle-
ar-capable cruise missiles.2 In addition, 
their deployment has raised awareness 
among NATO allies that Europe has in 
fact been exposed to multiple nucle-
ar threats from Russian air- and sea-
based ballistic and cruise missiles for 
some time now.3 
In July of 2019, NATO’s defense minis-
ters agreed on the principles and pa-
rameters of NATO’s response. The al-
liance is devising a balanced package 
of defensive measures. There are no 
plans for deploying new land-based 
nuclear missiles in Europe. Instead, 
NATO is focusing on intelligence, sur-
veillance and reconnaissance; the de-
velopment of conventional capabili-
ties; air and missile defense; exercises, 
and the upkeep of a safe, secure and 
effective nuclear deterrent.4 It is 
determined to take all necessary steps 
to maintain the credibility and ef-
fectiveness of its deterrence.5 At the 
same time, NATO affirmed its commit-
ment to effective arms control. It also 
remains committed to a meaningful 
dialogue with Russia.
Russia’s Strategy
Deploying the missiles is part of Rus-
sia’s strategy6 aimed at destabilizing 
the West from the inside and intim-
idating it from the outside. Russia’s 
“hybrid” array of tools reaches from 
systematic disinformation to nuclear 
threats, flexibly tailored to the evolving 
situation in peacetime, crisis, and war. 
Russia’s superior military strength vis-
a-vis regions like the Baltic states gives 
the Russian leadership an option to 
create military facts on the ground. It 
is possible that its conventional forces 
could execute a rapid, pre-emptive at-
tack to achieve a limited landgrab be-
fore NATO would be able to react mili-
tarily. It is conceivable, too, that Russia 
could simultaneously threaten the use 
of deep conventional or nuclear strikes 
against European capitals and against 
civilian and military infrastructure of 
essential importance to deployment, 
reinforcement, and defense. Such a 
combined use of conventional and nu-
clear means could paralyze the Euro-
pean’s resolve to defend themselves, 
make the United States stay out of 
a conflict that would be confined to 
Europe and force NATO to stand down 
for fear of nuclear escalation.7 In that 
case, Moscow would have achieved a 
strategic success without a long war.8 
NATO’s Deterrence and  
Defense Posture
At the NATO summits in Warsaw in 
2016 and Brussels in 2018, allies in-
cluding Germany decided to sig-
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nif icantly strengthen NATO’s de-
terrence and defense posture. This 
is primarily aimed at denying Mos-
cow the option to quickly create a Fait 
Accompli by conventional means in 
a regional war on the eastern flank of 
NATO. Since 2014, the alliance has ta-
ken a multitude of far-reaching mea-
sures to that end.9 Given the deploy-
ment of Russia’s SSC-8, NATO must 
now further adapt its response in order 
to neutralize any threat posed by these 
intermediate-range missiles. Such 
defensive measures need to strength-
en the credibility and coherence of 
NATO’s posture in the eyes of the Rus-
sian strategists. 
Four measures are therefore of partic-
ular importance: (1) NATO’s rapid reac-
tion forces must be further reinforced, 
and all the conditions must be estab-
lished for quickly moving these forc-
es to where they would be required. 
They must be able to rapidly come to 
the support of allies on NATO’s flank, 
who would be exposed to a direct mil-
itary threat by Russia in a crisis. This 
requires a huge effort, particularly 
on the part of the Europeans.10 They 
should also (2) acquire far-reach-
ing and accurate conventional cruise 
missiles capable of paralyzing Rus-
sia’s ability to conduct war. (3) Most 
allies must massively improve their 
air and missile defense. Over the past 
20 years, it was dramatically reduced 
because it appeared unnecessary for 
crisis response missions and because 
defense budgets were consistently 
reduced. However, defending against 
the Russian SSC-8 requires the abili-
ty to quickly detect, track, and inter-
cept low-altitude cruise missiles after 
their launch. 
9  Summarized in Brauß, Heinrich: NATO Beyond 70: Renewing a Culture of Readiness; International Centre for 
Defence and Security, Tallinn, November 2018,  https://icds.ee/nato-beyond-70-renewing-a-culture-of-readiness  
(accessed on January 29, 2020).
10  The NATO Readiness Initiative 4-30 from 2018 has so far resulted in European allies providing 30 battalions, 
30 combat aircraft squadrons and 30 war ships equipped to be operational at the deployment location within 
30 days. It was also agreed that these forces should be further expanded to several rapidly operational brigades, 
combat aircraft groups, and maritime operational groups. For quick deployment across national borders, legal, 
logistical and infrastructural preparations must be made. Transport capacities, roads, railway lines, bridges, 
tunnels, ports, and airports suitable for the deployment of mechanized forces are needed. NATO and the EU are 
working together on this matter, and the European Commission is planning to co-finance the improvement of the 
infrastructure with several billion euros.
11  Some people still speak of tactical nuclear weapons when talking about missiles with a range of under 500 
kilometers or about bombs that are carried toward their target by tactical combat aircraft. Others believe that the 
use of any kind of nuclear weapon would be of “strategic” importance because it would fundamentally change the 
nature of a conflict. 
The final issue (4) concerns combat 
aircraft with the ability to carry Amer-
ican nuclear bombs to their targets. 
Their operational readiness should 
be increased, and their visibility im-
proved through exercises. The reason 
is that so-called tactical nuclear weap-
ons11 and Dual-Capable Aircraft (DCA) 
have become much more important 
with the deployment of the Russian 
SSC-8 and in view of NATO’s planned 
response. 
„Tactical” Nuclear Weapons and Du-
al-Capable Aircraft
Governments that have nuclear weap-
ons think and act in accordance 
with the logic of deterrence, be it in 
defense or offense: in defense, to pre-
vent an aggression, inhabit coercion, 
deny an aggressor possible options for 
action, and safeguard their own free-
dom of action; in offense, to intimidate 
and coerce the defender, to discour-
age resistance, and deny him options 
for an effective defense. NATO’s mili-
tary posture is defensive in nature. The 
alliance has an array of convention-
al and nuclear capabilities as well as 
cyber means. These capabilities allow 
for a multitude of options. In a crisis or 
There has been no consideration  
given to buying today’s most modern 
fighter aircraft, the F-35
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conflict, NATO would choose the ac-
tion that would most likely be capable 
of preventing an adversary from com-
mitting an aggression, or that would 
successfully defend against an attack 
and end the conflict at the lowest pos-
sible level. If the Russian leadership 
considers military aggression, it must 
come to the conclusion that the suc-
cess of such an aggression would be 
doubtful, that the disadvantages would 
outweigh the desired gains, and that in 
an extreme case, inacceptable damage 
would be inflicted on Russia itself. 
Apart from a small number of about 
150 B 61-1212 aircraft bombs stocked un-
der US supervision in several Europe-
an countries, there are no US nuclear 
weapons in Europe today. Therefore, 
these bombs are the only nuclear de-
terrence option that the United States 
has in Europe in the framework of 
NATO.13 B-61 bombs would be – once 
the US president has given his ap-
proval – carried toward their target by 
12  The exact figure is kept secret. The B-61-12 is a precision-guided bomb with variable explosive force of 0,3/ 
1,5/10 or 50 kT. In: Federation of American Scientist: Video Shows Earth-Penetrating Capability of B61-62 Nuclear 
Bomb, January 2016; https://fas.org/blogs/security/2016/01/b61-12_earth-penetration/ (accessed on January 
29, 2020).
13  All the other so-called tactical nuclear weapons from the time of the Cold War were withdrawn from Europe in 
the 1990s and destroyed. The United States currently plans to counter the Russian nuclear threat against Europe 
with sea-based missiles carrying nuclear warheads. In: United States of America/Department of Defense: Nuclear 
Posture Review 2018, pp 54/55; https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/articles/nnsa-completes-first-production-unit-
modified-warhead/  (accessed on January 29, 2020).
14  Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. Whether this is still the case in Turkey today is unclear. 
Great Britain and Greece also host facilities which, however, have not been activated. The United States also have 
capabilities of their own in Europe. Under SNOWCAT (Support of Nuclear Operations with Conventional Air Tactics), 
other European nations including Greece, Poland, the Czech Republic and Turkey can contribute to nuclear missions 
by providing fighter planes to escort the bombers. 
15  France and Britain have their own nuclear weapons under their national command. 
16  Most recently during their meeting in London in December 2019. See NATO – London Declaration, December 
4, 2019, Paragraph 6, in combination with NATO – Brussels Summit Declaration, July 11, 2018, Paragraph 33-36. 
In its White Book of 2016, Germany has committed itself in a similar manner: „As long as nuclear weapons can be 
an instrument in armed conflicts, the need for nuclear deterrence continues. The strategic nuclear capabilities of 
the alliance, especially those of the United States, are the ultimate guarantee for the security of its members. NATO 
continues to be a nuclear alliance. Germany remains involved in the alliance’s nuclear policy and the related planning 
through nuclear sharing.” In: Weißbuch 2016 – Zur Sicherheitspolitik und zur Zukunft der Bundeswehr, p. 65, https://
www.bundesregierung.de/resource/blob/975292/736102/64781348c12e4a80948ab1bdf25cf057/weissbuch-zur-
sicherheitspolitik-2016-download-bmvg-data.pdf?download=1 (accessed on January 29, 2020).
17  Mattelaer, Alexander: Articulating the logic of nuclear sharing; Egmont Royal Institute for International 
Relations, Security Policy Brief No. 116, October 2019, https://www.ies.be/files/SPB116.pdf (accessed on January 
29, 2020).
fighter planes and pilots provided by 
European allies.14 They therefore con-
stitute a joint capability of the United 
States and European countries which 
do not have any nuclear weapons of 
their own.15 
Over the past years, the alliance’s 
heads of state and government have 
repeatedly confirmed that NATO will 
remain a nuclear alliance as long as 
nuclear weapons exist.16 The B-61/
DCA capability has a multiple political 
and strategic function.17 It is the man-
ifest and concrete expression of the 
United States’ extended nuclear deter-
rence, the real proof of America guar-
anteeing Europe’s security through its 
own security, and deliberately assum-
ing the risks associated with that deci-
sion. The fact that European allies pro-
vide DCA combat aircraft and bunkers, 
storage facilities, and technical infra-
structure on their territory is in turn 
the expression of their willingness to 
share this particular risk. It is the sign 
of a deliberate sharing of burden and 
risk which strengthens the alliance’s 
coherence and solidarity.
At the same time, this risk sharing is 
the Europeans’ “entry ticket” for par-
ticipating in the nuclear planning at 
NATO and, in the case of an exercise 
or a mission being planned, for be-
ing consulted. Non-nuclear allies have 
NATO will remain a nuclear alliance 
as long as nuclear weapons exist
Germany’s Role in NATO’s Nuclear Sharing 
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a seat and a voice in NATO’s Nuclear 
Planning Group18 that has the political 
control over nuclear planning, exer-
cises, and any possible mission. “Nu-
clear sharing” (NS) is crucial for trust 
among allies and the coherence of the 
alliance. It lifts the pressure on nations 
that feel particularly threatened by 
Russia’s posture to develop their own 
nuclear capabilities. In that sense, NS 
also serves to limit nuclear prolifera-
tion in Europe. 
The B-61/DCA capacity sends out the 
strategic message that Russia’s territo-
ry will not remain a sanctuary if Russia 
attacks Europe with nuclear weapons. 
The ability to hit Russia’s own territory 
in an armed conflict is meant to neu-
tralize a Russian threat, deter Moscow 
from committing an aggression during 
a crisis, or help end an aggression un-
der way. It offers an array of flexible 
options to demonstrate determina-
tion during a crisis and, at the same 
time, respond appropriately and pro-
portionately: increase or lower the lev-
el of operational readiness; hold more 
exercises; relocate aircraft; sched-
ule exercises to coincide with NATO’s 
map exercises or in a joint scenar-
io with conventional forces; demon-
stratively relocate troops to specific 
areas of alliance territory; or, finally, 
implement a measured, selective, and 
deliberately limited nuclear strike 
in order to quickly end a war. These 
actions would be accompanied by ap-
propriate diplomatic and public mes-
sages to Moscow.19  
For all these reasons, the B-61/DCA 
capability remains central to NATO’s 
deterrence and defense posture.20 It 
will therefore play an important role in 
NATO’s response to the Russian inter-
mediate-range missiles. 
18  The Nuclear Planning Group has 28 defense ministers as members. France with its independent national nuclear doctrine does not take part.
19  NATO – Brussels Summit Declaration, July 11, 2018, Paragraph 35.
20  Mattelaer 2019.
21  With the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997, NATO unilaterally pledged to neither deploy nuclear weapons nor substantial combat forces permanently on the territory of 
what was then the new member states. In: Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, May 27, 1997; https://www.
nato.int/cps/su/natohq/official_texts_25468.htm (accessed on January 29, 2020). 
22  For details of the performance criteria of the possible Tornado successor, see Mölling, Christian/Brauss, Heinrich: The Tornado Complex, Conflicting Goals & Possible 
Solutions for the New German Combat Aircraft. DGAP Policy Brief 04, February 2020, https://dgap.org/de/forschung/publikationen/der-tornado-komplex (accesed on 12 
February 2020).
GERMANY’S ROLE IN 
NUCLEAR SHARING 
Given its central location, its politi-
cal weight, and its economic and mil-
itary potential, Germany is regarded 
as a crucial European ally by the Unit-
ed States as well as by other Europe-
an countries. Germany’s security ben-
efits from the arrangements of nuclear 
sharing (NS) to which Germany at the 
same time significantly contributes. 
Thus, Germany has a particular re-
sponsibility for safeguarding nuclear 
sharing which has a large part in the 
coherence and credibility of NATO’s 
structure of deterrence and defense. 
In no European country, the pro-
vision of nuclear means is popular 
with the wider public. Were Germa-
ny to withdraw from nuclear risk shar-
ing, other Europeans could follow its 
example. There would be a real dan-
ger, then, of Washington refusing to 
carry the nuclear risk for Europe’s 
security by itself. Particularly Euro-
pean nations on the alliance’s borders 
that feel exposed to direct military 
threats are likely to see the abandon-
ment of NS as a violation of alliance 
solidarity. They could be tempted to 
take unilateral measures, setting a 
dynamic in motion which could end 
up putting a lot of pressure on NA-
TO’s self-imposed limitations under the 
NATO-Russia Founding Act.21 
The Tornado Succession
Germany should therefore maintain its 
contribution to NS and all its compo-
nents in a credible and reliable way. To 
underpin this political responsibility, 
the federal government must choose 
the right successor for its Tornado 
aircraft. It should take its decision so 
that the new aircraft will be available 
from 2025, as that is the date when the 
Tornados should be taken out of ser-
vice after more than 50 years. To con-
tinue using the more than 90 Torna-
do aircraft beyond that date would be 
unreasonably costly and carry seri-
ous technical risks. The DCA commit-
ment vis-à-vis NATO could no longer 
be credibly fulfilled. 
For the pending decision, the perfor-
mance, availability for the conventional 
and nuclear task, and cost of the possi-
ble Tornado successors should all play 
a role.22
• The Eurofighter (EF) is essen-
tially a fourth-generation fight-
er plane. It has been certified for 
a limited role in air to ground at-
tack with air-to-surface weapon-
ry. However, the EF would need to 
be refitted extensively and expen-
sively for the DCA role. This would 
take time, too. For a nuclear mis-
sion, it would have to be accom-
panied by other combat aircraft, 
increasing the overall number 
of planes required. Certification 
would take a long time, meaning 
that the EF could not be ready to 
replace the Tornado on sched-
ule. But the EF will for the next 30 
years remain the backbone of the 
German Luftwaffe’s flying combat 
fleet, particularly in the role of air 
defense. To further develop its us-
ability and operational capability 
the Long-Term-Evolution (LTE) is 
necessary and appropriate.
• The F-18 E/F Super Hornet is a 
fourth-generation US aircraft. Ac-
cording to US statements, it may 
be possible to get it equipped for 
nuclear missions by 2025, but it 
would then also need to be certi-
fied for a nuclear role. For a nu-
clear mission, it would need to be 
accompanied by other aircraft (for 
Germany’s Role in NATO’s Nuclear Sharing 
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instance the EA-18G) that have 
been optimized for electronic 
warfare. This increases the overall 
requirement for planes.
• The F-35A is also an American 
fighter plane, but a model of the 
fifth generation. It is the most 
modern combat aircraft currently 
available, designed to carry tacti-
cal nuclear weapons and certified 
in accordance with US require-
ments. Experts agree that it is 
the aircraft which currently best 
fulfils the military and technical 
requirements.
Given Germany’s necessary con-
tribution to the reinforcement of 
NATO’s deterrence and defense after 
the end of the INF treaty, the choice of 
the Tornado successor should be tak-
en in view of the following political and 
military elements and criteria:
• Strategic importance of the DCA 
mission. The strategic importance 
of the DCA mission means that its 
dedicated instruments must have 
maximum credibility. For an op-
ponent, defense against a DCA 
mission has the highest priority. 
It is therefore the most difficult 
and dangerous mission for pilots 
and their combat aircraft. Before 
starting any DCA mission, NATO 
would have an in-depth discus-
sion. It would be approved only if 
23  In the north, the Baltic and the Black Sea regions and more recently in Syria, Russia has installed multilayered systems of capabilities called „Anti-Access/Area Denial 
(A2AD) Capability.“ In a war, they could massively impair the deployment of NATO forces for reinforcing eastern allies. This is why allied air forces must be able to neutralize 
these A2AD “umbrellas.”
24  Belgium, Denmark, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and Poland will purchase F-35. Finland and Spain have not decided yet. 
it was considered the best pos-
sible option to end a war in Eu-
rope. It must be credible that such 
a mission can be relied on to be 
a success, otherwise the political 
message will fail. The DCA capac-
ity needs to be permanently avail-
able in sufficient quantity and the 
best quality in order to effectively 
contribute to deterrence and the 
preservation of peace.
• Essential military functions and 
capabilities. The Tornado suc-
cessor must have the capability 
to conduct conventional attacks 
and manned tactical reconnais-
sance missions, to suppress en-
emy air defense, and to execute 
DCA missions. Replacing the Tor-
nados must not lead to a loss of 
capabilities. For the credibili-
ty of DCA missions, the aircraft 
and their crews must have the 
highest degree of ability to pre-
vail and survive. Russian air de-
fense is modern and very dense; it 
consists of high-performance ra-
dar, a multitude of other sensors, 
multiple air defense missiles, and 
a flying air defense with compre-
hensive capabilities for electronic 
warfare.23 NATO’s combat aircraft 
need to provide sufficient guaran-
tees that they can win the expec- 
ted high-intensity battle against 
such an opponent with sufficient 
probability, and that they can 
penetrate deeply enough into 
enemy airspace to steer a nucle-
ar weapon to its target and then 
return. Only then will the option 
of such a mission decisively in-
fluence the opponent’s risk eval-
uation and achieve the required 
deterrent effect. 
• Assured availability and fu-
ture viability. The successor of 
the Tornado should, if at all pos-
sible, be available from 2025. By 
then, it will also need to be cer-
tified for carrying B61-12 nucle-
ar bombs. That is the precondition 
for a quick step-by-step decom-
missioning of the Tornados. There 
should be no temporary solution 
to bridge the gap until the de-
ployment of the “Next Generation 
Fighter” (NGF). The NGF is intend-
ed to be part of the Future Combat 
Air System (FCAS) that Germany 
and France have agreed to develop 
together. But it will only become 
available from 2040 at the earli-
est. Today, it seems uncertain and 
even questionable whether FCAS/
NGF would be available as a DCA 
within NATO for US bombs, and 
whether it would be certifiable. A 
bridging solution would therefore 
not be sufficiently viable.
• Interoperability . The succes-
sor of the Tornado must be able 
to work together smoothly and 
effectively with other allied air-
craft. In this context, it is par-
ticularly important to note that 
seven European members of 
NATO have already decided to 
purchase F-35 aircraft, includ-
ing all the other DCA nations.24 
Germany’s federal government  
has the responsibility to 
provide its pilots,with  
the best suited combat aircraft
Germany’s Role in NATO’s Nuclear Sharing 
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Consequently, the F-35 will be the 
combat aircraft that will dominate 
the relevant NATO planning and 
procedures for the coming years. 
The Tornado successor needs to 
be able to fulfill the entirety of its 
tasks within a combined air opera-
tion together with F-35 aircraft. It 
must not have any capability defi-
cits that might endanger allies in 
critical situations. There must be 
no doubt about interoperabili-
ty with allies that are purchasing 
F-35, especially in an area as sen-
sitive as the European contribu-
tion to NATO’s nuclear deterrence. 
In addition, Germany must keep 
the promise that it will be able 
to lead a Multinational Air Group 
within NATO. It is obvious that the 
required interoperability will most 
surely be achieved with an identi-
cal type of combat aircraft.
• Su f f i c i e n t  d i ve r s i f i c a t i o n . 
According to the regulations of 
Germany’s Military Air Strate-
gy25, the country’s f leet of com-
bat aircraft should consist of more 
than one type of aircraft to safe-
guard f lexibility in the perfor-
mance of missions. With the Tor-
nado and the Eurofighter, this has 
so far been the case. The decision 
about the successor model of the 
Tornado should also respect this 
principle.
• Cost efficiency. The costs of pur-
chase and maintenance over the 
coming decades of the different 
options for the Tornado succes-
sion must be in reasonable pro-
portion to their capabilities in the 
conventional and the nuclear role. 
A combat plane that has all the ca-
pabilities that it will need today 
and in the foreseeable future for 
its conventional, but particularly 
for its DCA role, allows for small-
er overall numbers than a plane 
that needs to be accompanied by 
25  Germany’s military airforce strategy in principle recommends using two different combat aircraft in parallel. In: BMVg – Militärische Luftfahrtstrategie 2016, S. 17.
26  For a detailed analysis and summary of the main political, military, technological, industrial, and cost elements that should be taken into account for the political decision 
about the Tornado succession, see Mölling/Brauß 2020.
27  Mölling/Brauß 2020.
other planes in order to be able to 
survive battle and accomplish the 
mission.
• Comprehensive analysis .  The 
possible successors of the Tor-
nado should be rated in a com-
prehensive analysis that takes the 
political-military criteria and the 
effects on NATO into account. In 
addition, the consequences for 
European integration and the Eu-
ropean defense industrial base 
relevant to Germany’s interests, 
its contribution to the develop-
ment of modern European tech-
nology and to the Europeans’ 
ability to act, need to be consid-
ered. This analysis should lead to 
a well-founded political decision 
that the federal government can 
explain to the German public as 
well as its allies.26 
CONCLUSIONS
Germany’s federal government has 
the responsibility to provide its pilots, 
which have to be able to fulfill a partic-
ularly dangerous combat mission, with 
the best suited combat aircraft. NATO 
must be able to rely on that. The politi-
cal-military considerations and criteria 
lead to the conclusion that the feder-
al government should revise its initial 
decision to only consider the F-18 and 
the Eurofighter. Before taking the fi-
nal decision, the F-35 should be in-
cluded in the comparative analysis and 
evaluation.
The result of such a comprehensive 
analysis could be a package of three 
essential measures27: first, choosing 
the aircraft that best fulfils the polit-
ical-military criteria as a replacement 
for the DCA Tornados; second, imple-
menting the long-term program to 
increase the combat capacity of the 
Eurofighter until at least 2040 and re-
placing the remaining Tornado air-
craft; and third, undiminished invest-
ment in research and development for 
the FCAS/NGF. 
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